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MICHAEL W. McBRIDE, ALPINE LTD., : 
and FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE Case No. 920705-CA 
INSURANCE COMPANY, GEODYNE II, : 
a Utah general partnership, 
DAN C. SIMONS, and ARDEN J. : 
BODELL, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Plaintiff agrees with defendants1 jurisdiction statement. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The first issue is whether this appeal has been made moot 
except for determining the effect of plaintiff's attorney's lien. 
A Satisfaction of Judgment was filed by associates of defendants 
who acquired the plaintiff McKean's interest in the judgment at an 
execution sale. If the court determines that the Satisfaction of 
Judgment resolved the issues in dispute, it is unnecessary to 
address the other issues raised on appeal. (See the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by Judge Rokich May 5, 1993, 
pursuant to the temporary remand order of this court. Record, pp. 
2 
1799-1800) The issue of the effect and amount of plaintiff's 
attorney's lien is the subject of a separate lawsuit filed pursuant 
to the trial court's order at the time this matter was temporarily 
remanded by this court to the trial judge. 
Defendants have stated seven issues for review. These 
need not be addressed if the suit has become moot. Defendants 
represent that each of their issues are issues of law to which the 
court need accord no deference to the ruling of the lower court. 
By identifying all issues as being issues of law, defendants accept 
the factual findings of the court as being correct. The Utah 
Supreme Court has held that trial court findings should not be 
disturbed on appeal where appellant does not attempt to marshall 
evidence to demonstrate error. Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176 
(Utah 1989) By defendants' identification of all issues as issues 
of law, the Findings of Fact should be accepted as accurate. This 
diminishes the need for plaintiff to respond to the references in 
defendants' brief to factual evidence other than the court's 
findings of fact. However, some of the issues as stated in 
defendants' brief misinterpret or misapply the court's factual 
findings. These are addressed as follows: 
Defendants' Issue "A" incorrectly states that "Cook, 
Lamoreaux, Hansen, and New Empire Development had previously 
conveyed their interest in the property to Child." To the 
contrary, the court specifically found that there had not been a 
conveyance of the New Empire Group's interest in said property to 
3 
Child. (Finding of Fact 29) Defendants' issue is based on facts 
contrary to the court's findings. 
Defendants' Issue "B" asks: Did the lower court err in 
holding that the Uniform Real Estate Contract between Cook, 
Lamoreaux, Hansen, and New Empire Development, as Sellers, and 
Child, as Buyer, was nothing more than an option, which was never 
exercised? In Finding of Fact 29 (Record, p. 679) and Conclusion 
of Law 5 (Record, p. 681-682), the court determined that the 
essential elements of delivery and consideration were not present. 
Documents were placed in escrow subject to future conditions 
occurring. The court found this issue factually in favor of 
plaintiff. The issue as framed overlooks the significant findings 
of the court before the judge characterized the proposal as being 
"no more than an option that was never exercised." 
Defendants' Issue "C" is incomplete in its reference to 
the status of Myron Child's bankruptcy proceedings. The issue as 
framed fails to state that Child's chapter 11 bankruptcy was 
dismissed without discharge and that Child's assets including his 
contractual rights except for the security interest in Traverse 
Mountain reverted to him. (See Finding of Fact 33, Record p. 679) 
Furthermore, the court found that the New Empire Group's interest 
in the property had never been conveyed to Child. (See Finding of 
Fact 29, Record, p. 678) The court further found that the New 
Empire Group's claim against Alpine Ltd. had been assigned to 
plaintiff. (Findings of Fact 21 and 22) 
4 
Defendants1 Issue "G" reads: Did the trial court err in 
refusing to hold that McKean's claims be completely set off against 
amounts owed by his assignors to Alpine under the Alpine Contract? 
This leaves incorrect inferences. The court found factually that 
at the time of default there were no sums owed by McKean or his 
assignors to Alpine. (See Finding of Fact 28, Record p. 678) 
Defendants' issues as framed suggest facts not supported by the 
Record and inconsistent with the trial court's ruling. Plaintiff 
concurs that defendants' issues "D," "E," and "F" are questions of 
law applied on the basis of the facts set forth in the court's 
findings. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff (McKean) concurs with the defendants' statement 
under the heading "Statement of the Case" in defendants' Brief, 
page 4. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Identification of the Parties 
1. Defendant Alpine Ltd. is a limited partnership that 
entered into a contractual agreement on June 1, 1978, to sell real 
property to New Empire Group. The contract was breached by Alpine, 
Ltd., the primary defendant in this proceeding. (Findings of Fact 
3, 9, 10, Record 673-74) 
2. Defendants Michael McBride. Dan C. Simons, and Arden 
J. Bodell were the general partners of defendant Geodvne II. 
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Defendant Geodyne II, acting through its general partners, was the 
general partner of Alpine Ltd. There were no other general 
partners of defendants Alpine Ltd. or Geodyne II. (Finding of Fact 
7, Record, p. 673) McBride, Simons, and Bodell are named 
defendants in their role as general partners, having an identity of 
interest with defendants Alpine Ltd. and Geodyne II. 
3. The New Empire Group is a partnership consisting of 
Myron B. Child, Jr. (hereafter "Child"), Ronald B. Cook (hereafter 
"Cook"), Ray W. Lamoreaux (hereafter "Lamoreaux"), Wendell P. 
Hansen (hereafter "Hansen"), and New Empire Development Company 
(hereafter "New Empire Development"). (Findings of Fact 9, Record 
673-74) The New Empire Group entered into a contract for purchase 
of land from Alpine Ltd. The contract was breached when Alpine 
could not or would not deliver the land. These individuals are not 
parties to these proceedings. The New Empire Group assigned their 
cause of action for breach of contract to plaintiff McKean who had 
paid $330,000 to Alpine Ltd. for the undelivered land. 
4. Richard McKean is the plaintiff. In behalf of 
himself and the New Empire Group, he paid $330,000 to Alpine for 
which he was immediately entitled to the release of specified real 
property. The land was not delivered. New Empire assigned its 
cause of action to McKean, and this lawsuit for breach of contract 
and other relief was brought in McKeanfs own behalf and under the 
assignment. 
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Alpine-New Empire Contract 
5. In 1978, the New Empire Group contracted to purchase 
certain real property located near the Point of the Mountain 
between Salt Lake and Utah Counties known as the Traverse Mountain 
property. (Findings of Fact 9 and 10 Record, pp. 673-74) 
6. The contract provided for the buyer to pay annual 
payments of $330,000 and further provided that the buyer would have 
the right to designate and receive land having a value of 2/3 of 
the amount of payments made on the contract. The contract also 
specified the manner of land selection. (Finding of Fact 26, 
Record, p. 677) 
McKean-New Empire Contract 
7. On June 7, 1979, McKean entered into a written 
contract with the New Empire Group to acquire the Traverse Mountain 
property which New Empire was acquiring from Alpine. (Finding of 
Fact 12, Record, p. 674) Pursuant to the contractual agreement, 
McKean timely paid the 1979 annual installment of $330,000 to 
Alpine Ltd. through its escrow agent and specifically identified 
the particular land to be released under the contract. (Findings 
of Fact 13 and 14, Record, pp. 674-75) 
8. At a meeting between McBride (Alpine), McKean, and 
his attorney, land was selected and defendants agreed to release 
specific land on Traverse Mountain to McKean which had a value of 
$220,000. The promised land was never released to either McKean or 
the New Empire Group. (Finding of Fact 27, Record, p. 678) 
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9. At the time McKean made the payment, the New Empire 
Group was current in all its payments and was not in default in any 
of the material conditions of the June 1, 1978, contract with 
defendants. The court specifically found that defendants breached 
their contract by failing to release to McKean or the New Empire 
Group real property having 2/3 of the value of the $330,000 
payment. (Finding of Fact 28, Record, p. 678) 
10. Alpine Ltd. failed and refused to convey the 
specified property to McKean or New Empire Group despite demand 
letters sent by plaintiff to Alpine's agent and title company 
(Finding of Fact 16, Record, p. 675) and a Notice of Default sent 
to defendants McBride and Alpine (Finding of Fact 17, Record, p. 
675) . 
11. On September 20, 1980, Child offered to acquire the 
New Empire Group's interest in the Alpine-New Empire Contract. 
Child offered to pay $1.5 million for that interest within 18 
months. However, the executed documents which would have given him 
the opportunity to acquire said property were placed in escrow 
conditioned upon not being released until Child paid the $1.5 
million. Child made no payments to the New Empire Group and the 
contract and assignment were not delivered to him. The court found 
that no consideration had been paid by Child for the right to 
acquire said property and the contract documents or property had 
not been delivered to him. The court ruled that the arrangements 
between Child and the other New Empire Group members were 
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substantially the same as an option entered into without 
consideration. (Findings of Fact 29, Record, pp. 278-79) Physical 
possession of the land remained with Alpine Ltd. during this 
period. Neither Child nor New Empire had possession or use of the 
subject property. 
12. Prior to the expiration of the 18 month period 
during which Myron Child had the opportunity to acquire the subject 
property from the New Empire Group, he filed a chapter 11 
bankruptcy. He claimed to have a $36/000,000.00 ownership interest 
in the subject property. Mr. Child obtained confirmation of a 
bankruptcy plan which would require him to sell the property for 
not less than $8,000,000.00 so that the secured positions of all 
interested parties could be paid. (See Exhibit P-32) 
13. When a buyer could not be found between 1982 and 
1985 who could comply with the bankruptcy plan requirements, the 
court ordered the bankruptcy trustee to sell the Traverse Mountain 
property free and clear of liens at auction to the highest bidder. 
In February 1985, the bankruptcy trustee sold the Traverse Mountain 
property free and clear of liens to a consortium controlled by 
Alpine Ltd. and the Child bankruptcy plan by its own terms became 
null and void. (Exhibit 32 at page 28 attached as Exhibit "I" to 
defendants1 brief.) The purchase price at the bankruptcy sale was 
only sufficient to pay administrative expenses of the bankruptcy 
proceeding and to assume certain secured obligations which were 
senior to Alpine Ltd.'s interest in the subject property. The 
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assumed interests excluded the interests of McKean or his assignors 
which were junior to Alpine's interest in the property. (Finding 
of Fact 31, Record, p. 679, Exhibit D-50) 
14. On June 12, 1985, all members of the New Empire 
Group assigned to McKean their claims against Alpine Ltd. arising 
out of defendants1 breach of contract. (Finding of Fact 21; 
Conclusion of Law 6) 
15. Any remaining interest of Myron Child in the 
Traverse Mountain property sold by the bankruptcy trustee was 
abandoned by the bankruptcy trustee pursuant to court order entered 
July 10, 1985. (Finding of Fact 32) 
16. On February 25, 1988, the Child bankruptcy was 
dismissed without discharge. No effort was made by the bankruptcy 
trustee to void the June 12, 1985, assignment given by Child to 
McKean. All remaining assets and contract rights reverted to 
McKean. (Finding of Fact 33) 
17. McKean filed the Complaint in this action on June 
21, 1985. (Findings of Fact 23, 31, Record 677-679) 
18. Defendants never conveyed the real estate required 
to be conveyed to New Empire or Richard McKean nor have they 
refunded any portion of the $330,000 paid by McKean. (Finding of 
Fact 34, Record, p. 680) 
19. The trial court held that as a result of the breach 
of contract by defendants in failing to convey land or refund the 
money, McKean has been damaged in the sum of $220,000 together with 
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interest as provided by law calculated from the date McKean made 
his $330,000 payment. (Finding of Fact 35, Record, p. 680) 
20. The trial court found all equity issues in 
plaintiff's favor and held: 
As a matter of equity the property should have 
been conveyed to plaintiff. The defendants 
Michael McBride and Alpine Ltd. did not come 
into court with "clean hands." Defendants 
Michael McBride and Alpine Ltd. should not be 
able to benefit from the wrongful acts of 
their partner. Defendants Michael McBride and 
Alpine Ltd. should not be able to retain both 
the land and the payment for the land. The 
equitable issues should be found in favor of 
plaintiff. 
The following pertinent facts were determined on the 
order entered by this court for temporary remand of this case and 
were stipulated to between the parties. (See Record, pp. 1800-
1803) These facts address the issue of whether the appeal is moot, 
but do not pertain to the other issues on appeal. 
21. Pursuant to a written agreement plaintiff's attorney 
claims an attorney's lien on the cause of action and the proceeds 
therefrom. A copy of the Notice of Attorney's Lien was initially 
filed with the Third Judicial District Court on September 11, 1990, 
and was amended April 17, 1992. 
22. A court order was signed by Judge John Rokich on 
March 20, 1992, pursuant to stipulation between plaintiff McKean 
and defendants which provided a stay of execution in lieu of a 
supersedeas bond, provided that certain assets would be pledged as 
security to provide payment of the judgment upon appeal 
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affirmation. Pursuant to said Stipulation, documents were executed 
and filed that gave public notice and perfected the security 
interests with the Clerk of the Court as the secured party. Said 
order restrained the transfer of certain assets by the defendants. 
23. In a separate matter, in 1984 WestOne Bank, as the 
successor to FMA Thrift and Loan Company and Moore Financial 
Company obtained a judgment against several individuals and 
businesses including Richard McKean in an action filed in the First 
District Court, Box Elder County, State of Utah, entitled FMA 
Thrift and Loan Company, et al. v. Alpha Leasing Company, et al., 
civil no. 17754. 
24. On September 28, 1991, WestOne Bank assigned a 
portion of its interest in the judgment obtained in the WestOne 
Bank action to Delaware Funding & Guaranty. Delaware thereafter 
executed on the judgment against McKean in the WestOne Bank action 
by causing the judgment in the present case to be sold at an 
execution sale conducted by the Salt Lake County Sheriff. 
Delaware, acting in the name of WestOne Bank, purchased the 
judgment at the sale by bidding $10,000.00 of the WestOne judgment. 
25. At the sheriff fs sale and prior to bidding, 
plaintiff McKeanfs attorney Ralph Tate announced to all present 
that the judgment was subject to an attorney's lien of 
approximately $185,000 together with accruing interest. Because of 
said execution sale, Delaware now claims to be the successor to 
plaintiff McKean and to be the owner of all plaintiff McKean's 
interest in this matter. 
26, Richard •'• Christenson ; e president of Delaware 
Fund inqii and Cluardnlv ' iristensoi s various corporations 
provided a major portion * w* funding for Traverse Mountain and 
were primary credit. <•* " i- i I ' 
Christenson ?? als;. ,, President Franklin Financial 1Jtah 
corporation Frankl i r. Financial and defendant Geodyne 11 are 
genera] . .- • •-. R li I ? e s t m e n t s I td a I J tal: I I ii in :i ted 
Partnership )efendant Alpine, Ltd., is a limited partner of "TR 
Investments The collateral pledged as security in this matter 
incLudes pinp L; interest . * investments, Ltd. 
Januar y~r< Richar* Christenson, 
represent i • ' - • : e Fi u id :i ng 
& Guaranty whic^ .laimed successor ^ plaintiff 
McKean's interest In this action, executed and filed a Satisfaction 
II* hid'imont i, i h i in i i mini >i i nn| • ! tt.iMy M'/Ke-m"' •• | PI< icj<n#"»• 
28. Plaintiff 1 ittorney had no knowledge r 
agreement or assignment between the parties until January : 
. m d h . i i i i i l o t : < i J I I M M I I <>il I I lie s.il i s i a c t io i it I IIP j udgment and * \z 
not been paid any sums pursuant to his attorney"s lien 
herein. 
2 9 The parties through their respective attorneys 
stipulated in open court that the assets which have been pledged in 
I i em I.I I r"i s u p e r s e d e a s Ibni'iidl wi nil I nil in it lav i e . l ease t j , w 11, hoi it I HI I Ihi »ii 
order of the court after an equitable acti on to be filed by 
plaintiff's counsel as to the validity and amount of plaintiff's 
counsel's attorney's lien is determined. 
30. Pursuant to the trial court's order on temporary 
remand of this appeal, plaintiff's counsel has brought an action in 
equity for a determination of his right to enforce his attorney's 
lien. Said action is currently pending in the Third Judicial 
District Court as case no. 930902810CN. 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following items in defendants1 Statement of Facts are 
significantly incorrect and are inconsistent with the findings of 
the trial judge. 
In Statement of Fact "C" on page 6 of defendants' brief, 
defendants represent that New Empire Development conveyed its 
interest in the Traverse Mountain property to Myron Child. This is 
an incorrect statement of the court's Finding of Fact 29 which 
reads: 
29. On September 20, 1980, New Empire 
Development, Hansen, Cook, and Lamoreaux as 
sellers entered into an agreement with 
defendant Child whereby Child had an 
opportunity to acquire the remaining interest 
of Hansen, Cook, and Lamoreaux in the June 1, 
1978, contract with Alpine upon payment of 
$1.5 million. Said Contract and an assignment 
were to be placed in escrow conditional upon 
not being released until Child paid said sum. 
Said payment of $1.5 million was to be paid 
within 18 months. Child made no payments 
pursuant to said agreement either as 
consideration or as payment under the 
agreement. The Contract and assignment were 
not delivered. No consideration was paid by 
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Child for said option agreement. Childfs 
bankruptcy was filed before the option period 
expired. The agreement was at best no more 
than an option that was never exercised by 
Myron Child or the bankruptcy trustee. 
The court's Conclusion of Law 5 reads: 
5> T h e option to assign the interest of 
New Empire and Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen to 
Myron Child on September 30, 1980, was never 
exercised or consummated. The proposed 
assignment was subject to Child giving 
consideration, exercising the option, and 
meeting escrow conditions for document 
delivery. Consideration was not paid and the 
documents placed in escrow were not delivered 
to Child. The conditions of escrow were not 
met and the transaction was not consummated. 
The effect of the purported assignment was to 
create an option with Myron Child which was 
never exercised. The interest of Myron Child 
that became subj ect to the bankruptcy 
proceeding of Myron Child did not include the 
interests of other partners of New Empire. 
Howevei bankruptcy court had and 
exercised authority to sell the entire 
Traverse Mountain property free and clear of 
liens without adjudication of claims and 
interests. 
There was not a conveyance • interest : Traverse Mountain 
p i Y i p p r t y f i c ill 1 in1 IMP i b :eptanct; • i 
deliver y of the contract was conditioned -r events tha* r-e. * :• 
occurred a\ therefore there was no conveyance. 
c !:: "J " :: i i, page 9 of defendants1 brief,, the Statement 
of Fact discusses Myr on Child's Third Amended Plar 
Reorganization but fails to state that 
never consummated and became null and void by its ow11 terms. The 
bankruptcy proceeding was dismissed without discharge. (See 
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Finding of Fact 33, Record p. 680) Despite the fact that Child's 
accepted plan required a minimum property sale price of 
$8,000,000.00, the plan was never carried through. Ultimately the 
bankruptcy trustee sold the property free and clear of liens at an 
auction without compliance with the bankruptcy plan. Shortly 
thereafter the bankruptcy dismissal occurred without discharge or 
payment to creditors. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The matter should be dismissed as being moot except 
for determination at the trial court level of the effect of 
plaintiff's attorney's lien. This is because a Satisfaction of 
Judgment has been filed by defendants' business associates who 
acquired plaintiff's interest in the judgment at an execution sale. 
In the event the court does not dismiss the appeal as being moot, 
the following summary of history and arguments should be 
considered. 
2. In 1978 defendant Alpine Ltd. contracted with the New 
Empire Group to sell certain real property known as Traverse 
Mountain. The contract provided for annual minimum payments of 
$330,000.00 and a partial release of land equal to 2/3 of the value 
of sums paid. In 1979 New Empire contracted with plaintiff McKean 
for him to pay the annual payment and receive the designated land. 
Pursuant to the contract, McKean paid defendant Alpine Ltd. 
$330,000 and designated the land to be received. Defendants failed 
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and refused +-~ release land worth $220,nnn as required under the 
contract c refund plaintiff's money nsuccessful efforts to 
re so] v • • t - *, '• , . < T*73C 
unable or unwilling to deliver good title - * < u:d 
Myron Child offered to buy out the other" New Empi . * J1 
intof est in I he contract with Alpine Ltd. if he could obtain the 
necessary financial resources. Contract documents consisting i 
real estate 
deliver to * * •- • '^  ^ ^00 purchase price. The 
trial court properly found that Child did not pay i .v onsideration 
111 t. onip J e t: o ir11 •. aoqi J j s 11; i on r vt\\ i i rements and acquire the 
interest of the other New Empire Group partners in the subject 
property. 
3. Myron, Child filed a chapter 1 ] bankruptcy 
proceeding. When Child filed bankruptcy, bankruptcy law 
automat i oa 1 I v nioyotJ aiirlP I t * i»11 M't «««ii ,i f 1 ert j inj ||H> properly 
between February 1982 and February 198b. McKean was unable to meet 
the conditions bankruptcy plan * - - bankrupts L 
ordered ' he T" • ' * )ino»pei"io * - ° 
property was sold free and clear <;: i v • * bankruptcy 
trustee, McKean (individually and as assignee < ' 
flroup' o i ntererit) pur; v ij defendant Alpine Ltd. and its general 
partners for dollar damages or equitable relief to recover his 
$330,000. McKean'ii i ojlil I i <;*i-m n i o upeci ( ir fjerfoi iiiiaiioe of 
delivery of land had been eliminated by the bankruptcy court action 
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in selling the Traverse Mountain real estate free of liens. 
Defendants claim that the bankruptcy courtfs order approving the 
bankruptcy plan of Myron Child encompasses determinations that are 
res judicata. The trial court found that the issues involving 
plaintiff McKean were not barred under the principle of res 
judicata. There was not an identity of issues and parties for 
application of this doctrine. The bankruptcy court did not 
adjudicate any rights of the parties. It only sold the real 
estate. In addition, the bankruptcy order became "null and void" 
by its own terms when the plan failed. The bankruptcy court order 
also only governed Child's interest in the subject property. It 
did not govern either McKeanfs or the interests of the other New 
Empire assignees. Only the property was sold. The Child 
bankruptcy was ultimately dismissed without discharge. All other 
rights were reinstated. 
4. McKean's claim arises under a written contract that 
provides for a six year statute of limitations. The action was 
filed within six years of Alpine's breach of contract. Defendants 
assert that the contract should be governed by a four year statute 
of limitations. The trial court found that the six year statute 
applied, but that it would make no difference whether a four year 
or six year statute is applicable because of the three year tolling 
effect of the bankruptcy proceeding on the statute of limitations. 
The Myron Child bankruptcy proceeding stayed any legal action 
affecting the subject real estate for over three years from 
February 198,!, to March 1985. When the property was so] d free of 
liens, the optio * require specific performance was eliminated as 
a remedy « inn was timely filed. 
5 Alpine 4 assertion that the judgment should be 
offset against sums subsequently owed by Alp," U P uncier; th*. 
contract " i.i.Hly i-iilnml merit. Th€? court found that at * < H 
time McKean paid $330,000 and became entitled to have A 
conveyed, there was 
ass i gi lor s (the New Empire Group) The failure of Alpine Ltd. * i 
convey land precipitated total default on the contract. 
never did corn <p) ' possess] cm ,->l thin \>\ cpei iy and never conveyed i ;• 
land nor refunded any money to McKean or his assignors. New Empire 
McKean were not expected n 
1 not or i run I (I in if convey property for which it had been fully 
paid, Therefore, the court correctly found that there were 
owing by New Empire +• A 11 > i no ,11" I lii • t; i mc o I i if; I\i111!' , . , ,^ 
I'lefondant Alpine would be entitled to any claim of setoff. 
'ft Alpine Ltd, has .*. J- McKean or the New Empire 
Group the $33 0,000 or zom ' ey <= asi required under the 
contractual agreements between the parties. McKean deposited his 
$330,000 with defendant Alpine's agent and did not receive riny I,II il 
in refii 
The matter was tried before Judge John Rokich 
sitting witlunr ±u n.. «* 
Mrmoi .indum I. ^ . .-.. ^  subsequently its Findings 
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Conclusions of Law finding in favor of plaintiff and against 
defendants and awarded plaintiff $220,000 damages together with 
interest thereon and court costs. The $220,000 was based on the 
value of the land which Alpine was contractually obligated to 
release to McKean equal in value to 2/3 of the $330,000 payment to 
Alpine by McKean. 
This court is requested to determine either that the 
appeal is moot or that the issues raised by appellants are without 
merit, and affirm the trial court's decision in appellee's favor. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
DEFENDANTS1 APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED 
EXCEPT AS TO ISSUES OF PLAINTIFFfS ATTORNEY'S LIEN 
BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN MADE "MOOT" BY A 
SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT. 
This action was brought by plaintiff McKean in his own 
right and as an assignee of Ron Cook, Wendell Hansen, Ray 
Lamoreaux, and Myron Child, referred to herein as the "New Empire 
Group," to recover damages or such other relief as the court deemed 
appropriate for breach of a written contract to sell land. The 
court found in McKeanfs favor and ordered judgment accordingly. 
Subsequently, a creditor of McKean (WestOne Bank) who had a 
judgment against McKean sold a portion of its judgment against 
McKean to Delaware Funding & Guaranty (Richard Christenson) which 
was a business associate of the defendants. Delaware subsequently 
executed on the judgment in this case and purchased this judgment 
20 
at a sheriff's sale, Delaware/Christenson then entered into — 
agreement with the defendants (appellants action) - ~- • • 
|.
 h |P ] iKjicfinc?"nf i I. In n J . iiidt t e r s a t i s f i e d ('•!( 
in :er on Pending Motions - temporary remand; Record pp. 1799-
1805 Because the judgment satisfied, * appeal F rr -jt 
e:i! . - I n r u r j u i t ilt11 v iiii i ii.i I H ' I n e e x t e n t plaintif "^  
attorney's ;:. en attaches to the property pledged . y. 
supersedeas bond. That is an Issue in a s^ pat'rit 
which is pending In the Third Judicial District Court. 
II 
PLAINTIFF HAS A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION 
AGAINST DEFENDANTS BOTH IN HIS OWN BEHALF 
AND AS ASSIGNEE OF THE CLAIM OF THE PARTNERS 
OF THE NEW EMPIRE GROUP AGAINST ALPINE LTD. 
Tin..1 [.iarti.es iirkiLuwhidi.|u 1li.il ...is ui June 2b, 19i'y, McKean 
had paid $330,000 to Alpine Ltd Alpine, New Empire Group, and 
McKean a]1 recognized that McKean had 
return, for hi s payment (Findings i . i. . * Record, . 
McKean had an equitable interest he property t;- ;< ^ 
was entitled L.C_ •. McK 
equitable cause i action against Alpine Ltd. to require delivery 
of the land. When McKean could no longer recover the land, he was 
ontililed to f 11 f > rot ui ii I lii.s IIIUIH< (/ 'llir. was I isctl mi the written 
agreements between Alpine and the New Empire Group and between 
McKean and the New Empire Group and also upon " " part performanrp 
I >,, Mi/Kean b) Int. delwerv O-P +-he $ Alpine's agent. 
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McKean's payment was accepted by Alpine Ltd, The trial court found 
all issues of equity in plaintiff's favor. (Conclusion of Law 10, 
Record, p. 12) 
To avoid any question of McKean's right to proceed 
against Alpine Ltd. and to stand in the position of all the 
partners of New Empire Group, McKean obtained a written assignment 
of each of the members of New Empire Group's right, title, and 
interest arising under the contract with Alpine. Said assignment 
was given in consideration of McKean's agreement not to name 
members of the New Empire Group as defendants in the lawsuit. 
(Finding of Fact 22, Record, p. 676) 
Appellants argue that Hansen, Cook, Lamoreaux, and New 
Empire had sold their interest to Myron Child in 1980 and therefore 
had nothing to assign. Appellants' position is directly 
contradictory to Finding of Fact 29 in which the court found as 
follows: 
29. On September 20, 1980, New Empire 
Development, Hansen, Cook, and Lamoreaux as 
sellers entered into an agreement with 
defendant Child whereby Child had an 
opportunity to acquire the remaining interest 
of Hansen, Cook, and Lamoreaux in the June 1, 
1978, contract with Alpine upon payment of 
$1.5 million. Said Contract and an assignment 
were to be placed in escrow conditional upon 
not being released until Child paid said sum. 
Said payment of $1.5 million was to be paid 
within 18 months. Child made no payments 
pursuant to said agreement either as 
consideration or as payment under the 
agreement. The Contract and assignment were 
not delivered. No consideration was paid by 
Child for said option agreement. Child's 
bankruptcy was filed before the option period 
expired. The agreement was at best no more 
than an option that was never exercised by 
Myron Ch1'1/q ^ ^he bankruptcy trustee. 
Hansen, Cook, Lamoreaux did not convey any interest 
t. - ; * :i i lto ai 1 a g m : eemei it al 1 owing documents 
to be held . escrow subject : hild paying $ . * rr.. i OT 
never paid. Child w: r* occupying the lanu nor 
ocuments were escrowec Alpine . ^  
actual possession and did not convex * * * •./ . anc despite 
receiving partial payment from McKetin 
find buyers for the project so he could acquire the property and 
effect a profitable business transaction. 
A) I MI I lii 1 iiL.t !, <!]>p(-<i idiiil ," 1 1 1 t" 1 il suppor: . : * ^ 
claim of equitable conversion are distinguishable because they dec-
eases in which the buyer had the use of the ] and and possess 
line 1 out, Fnici i-ime r. child's bankruptcy, the 
only interest Traverse Mountain was : partnership 
interest in Mew Empire. Because he liaci .1 part 1 a.1 . * . .=^.t 111 I ln.< 
real estate, the bankruptcy court strong arm powers allowed them to 
sell the entire mountain free and clear of liens subject : senior 
indebtedness. Child incorrect 
o^ Traverse Mountain property lis bankruptcy schedules 
including the interest Empire partners. 
roa I itY "In 1 I I 1- partnership interest :• 
the contract wherein New Empire was to acquire the property from 
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Alpine Ltd. 
The bankruptcy court never addressed the issue of what 
portion of the property belonged to Mr. Child vs. other interested 
parties. The bankruptcy court's inherent powers allowed the 
trustee to sell Traverse Mountain free and clear of liens subject 
to appropriate senior indebtedness or allowing liens to attach to 
proceeds. Such action did not destroy either McKean or the other 
members of the New Empire Group's rights against Alpine resulting 
from Alpine's breach of contract in failing to convey property for 
the cash it had received from McKean. It did not take away from 
plaintiff McKean his direct right to recover damages from Alpine 
Ltd. Neither Alpine Ltd. nor the partners of New Empire Group 
other than Mr. Child were in bankruptcy. However, the land which 
was subject of the contract between Alpine and New Empire Group was 
subject to the bankruptcy court's control because of Child's 
partial interest. 
The principle of equitable conversion has no application 
because there was never a transfer of property to Child. The cause 
of action of New Empire Group and McKean against Alpine for breach 
of contract in failing to convey land or return the money upon the 
breach by Alpine was never conveyed to Child. 
The strong arm powers of the bankruptcy law allowed the 
court to sell the property free and clear of liens without 
adjudicating whether claims against the property were legal, 
equitable, or valid. In 1985 the bankruptcy trustee sold the 
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property free and clear of liens except for such senior 
indebtedness which was assumed by the buyer as part of its bid. 
Therefore, plaintiff McKean could no longer assert an actual lien 
on the property or claim a right to require specific performance. 
The trustee's sale did prevent plaintiff from proceeding to recover 
the land from Alpine Ltd. even though Alpine was the controlling 
party of the consortium which acquired the property. There were no 
excess proceeds against which McKean or New Empire could assert an 
interest. Plaintiff was forced to seek recovery of damages or 
other equitable relief against either Alpine or the New Empire 
Group. In consideration of not being sued, the New Empire Group 
assigned plaintiff their claim arising from Alpine's breach of 
contract. 
When the bankruptcy court sold the Traverse Mountain 
property, it did not dispose of claims of creditors. The cause of 
action remained. All that was lost was the security. Subsequently 
the bankruptcy was dismissed without discharge. 
U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 349, provides that 
dismissal of a case reinstates the voided liens, vacates the prior 
orders, and revests the interest of parties as they were before the 
commencement of the case. It becomes as if there was no bankruptcy 
filed except to the extent that the court will not undo bona fide 
sales of assets acquired in good faith through bankruptcy 
proceedings. 
Section 349 of the Bankruptcy Code (U.S.C. § 349) (copy 
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attached) shows the House and Senate Reports statements regarding 
the legislative intent: It reads: 
The basic purpose of the subsection is to undo 
the bankruptcy case, as far as practicable, 
and to restore all property rights to the 
position in which they were found at the 
commencement of the case. This does not 
necessarily encompass undoing sales of 
property from the estate to a good faith 
purchaser. 
Courts have regularly held that dismissal of a bankruptcy 
as far as practical restores everything to the condition it existed 
in prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy. In Neal v. First 
Alabama Bank of Huntsville. N.A.. 443 So.2d 1254 (1983), this 
principle is stated as follows: 
Generally, the dismissal of a bankruptcy 
proceeding is "limited in its effect to 
return things to the status quo ante." 9 
Am.Jur.2d "Bankruptcy" §391 (1980). As far as 
practicable, a dismissal operates to restore 
all property rights "to the position in which 
they were found at the commencement of the 
case." Id. This limitation upon the effect 
of a dismissal means that the bankruptcy 
court's dismissal of the proceeding does not 
amount to a judicial determination of the 
issues which would have been covered in the 
case. 
See also McDonell v. Eqqestein, 357 N.W.2d 168. 
Collier on Bankruptcy discussed Section 349 of the 
Bankruptcy Code with the following comments: 
The objective of section 349(b) is to undo the 
title 11 case, in so far as is practicable, 
and to restore all property rights to the 
position they occupied at the beginning of 
such case. 
In the case before the court, the plan by its own terms 
because "null and void" when its conditions were not met. The 
bankruptcy plan became a nullity when the property sold at auction 
for was for 1/4 of the sum set as the minimum acceptable selling 
price in the approved plan. Dismissal caused everyone to be 
reinstated to his prior position except that the court could not 
undo the effect of the lost security interests that were eliminated 
with the trustee's sale of the land. This left the secured 
creditors without their security in the land. 
In the Findings of Fact the court found: 
32. Any remaining interest of Myron Child 
in the Traverse Mountain property sold by the 
bankruptcy trustee was abandoned by the 
bankruptcy trustee pursuant to a court order 
entered July 10, 1985. The bankruptcy trustee 
had not exercised any option of Child to 
acquire the interest of others in the Traverse 
Mountain property or the June 1978 contract. 
33. The Child bankruptcy was dismissed 
without discharge by the U.S. bankruptcy 
trustee on February 25, 1988. The U.S. 
bankruptcy trustee took no action to void the 
June 12, 1985, assignment given by Child [to] 
McKean. 
The effect of the dismissal of Childfs bankruptcy is that 
all interests and claims without the land revert to the person who 
had them before the bankruptcy was filed. Defendants Cook, 
Lamoreaux, and Hansen retained their interests in their cause of 
action against Alpine. These interests had been assigned to 
plaintiff McKean. 
The bankruptcy court is a court of equity. With the 
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dismissal of the Child bankruptcy without discharge, all parties 
were restored to their legal rights to pursue claims except to the 
extent that the court's sale of real property extinguished the 
right of specific performance. It was not equitable that defendant 
Alpine collect the $330,000 from McKean and then retain the land 
which was to be released for said payment. Such a wrongful 
windfall goes against all principles of equity, whether adjudicated 
through the bankruptcy court, this court, or just common sense. 
Ill 
PLAINTIFF'S CAUSE OF ACTION IS NOT AFFECTED 
BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA BASED ON THE 
FACTS, PARTIES, AND ISSUES BEFORE THIS COURT. 
Appellants allege that since Myron Child's plan confirmed 
by the bankruptcy court provided Child could sell the property for 
a sum not less than $8 million and divide the property among 
creditors, it barred any other claims. This argument ignores the 
plain facts that Child's bankruptcy plan failed, became null and 
void, and his bankruptcy was dismissed. It also ignores the fact 
that plaintiff's claim is not primarily a claim against bankrupt 
Myron Child. It was a claim against Alpine Ltd. arising from a 
contract between Alpine and New Empire Group. At best, any order 
of the bankruptcy court would apply only to Child's interest in the 
property. 
Appellants argue that the plan created a new contract 
between the creditor and Child and cite cases to show that a 
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confirmed and effectuated plan constitutes a new contract. 
However, they readily admit that the Child bankruptcy plan was 
never completed and was breached when the property could not be 
sold under the terms set forth in the plan. By its own terms, it 
became void. The specific confirmed plan of Child (Exhibit 32, 
page 28, attached as Exhibit "I" to appellants' brief) provides: 
...[I]f for any reason whatsoever and 
regardless of fault, the Approved Sale (for at 
least $8,000,000) has not occurred on or 
before July 25, 1984, the Plan and all 
acceptances of the Plan and assumptions 
pursuant to the Plan shall be void and of no 
force or effect.... (Parenthesis portion 
added) 
The plan does not call for it to be voidable. It was simply void. 
The property was not sold before the July 25, 1984, required date. 
Subsequently, when the plan failed, the land was sold by the 
bankruptcy court free and clear of liens at auction. It was sold 
by a subsequent order of the bankruptcy court at auction, not under 
the confirmed plan. It was bought by a consortium headed by 
defendant Alpine. Alpine purchased the property by assuming 
certain senior indebtedness and paying some of the bankruptcy 
trustee's costs. 
Defendants rely on the case of Southmark Properties v. 
Charles House Corporation, 742 F.2d.862 (5th Cir. 1984). Southmark 
is readily distinguishable from the case at bar for the following 
reasons: 
1. The plan as approved in the Southmark case was 
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effectively completed without prejudice to the mortgage debtor, 
2. All of the property was owned by the bankrupt debtor, 
subject to the bank's mortgage. 
3. The parties in the Southmark post-bankruptcy action 
were the same parties (including the bankrupt) who were the 
principal debtor and creditor in the bankruptcy proceeding. 
4. The same cause of action was the subject of the 
bankruptcy court adjudication. 
In the case at bar, the trial court correctly found that 
Mr. Child's interest did not include the interests of the other New 
Empire partners. Consequently, even to the extent a contract 
existed, it only affected Mr. Child's claims with Alpine. However, 
the plan called for it to be void if its terms were not met. The 
plans terms were not met. The rights of McKean or the New Empire 
Group to pursue Alpine Ltd. for breach of contract were not 
diminished. Neither McKean nor the New Empire Group had a duty to 
assert claims against Alpine Ltd. in Mr. Child's bankruptcy 
proceedings. Distinguishing the Southmark case, the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held in D-l Enterprises. Inc. v. Commercial State 
Bank, 864 F.2d 36 (5th Cir. 1989) that counterclaims are not 
compulsory in quick motion-and-hearing style contested matters as 
they are in adversary matters. See also prior ruling in same 
matter at 852 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1988) 
The Utah Supreme Court has continually held that in order 
for res judicata to apply, the suits must involve the same parties 
and the same cause of action. See Schaer v. Utah Department of 
Transportation, 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983); Serr v. Rick Jensen 
Construction, Inc., 743 P.2d 1202 (Utah 1987); Searle Brothers v. 
Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 690 (Utah 1978) The Searle case applies a 4-
pronged test to res judicata which the court stated has been 
adopted by most jurisdictions: 
1. Was the issue decided in the prior 
adjudication identical with the one presented 
in the action in question? 
2. Was there a final judgment on the 
merits? 
3. Was the party against whom the plea is 
asserted a party or in privity with a party to 
the prior adjudication? 
4. Was the issue decided in the first case 
competently, fully, and fairly litigated? 
In the case before the court the parties and issues are 
significantly different, and by no stretch of the imagination can 
one claim that McKeanfs claim against Alpine was competently, 
fully, or fairly litigated. The principle of res judicata is 
simply not applicable to the facts before the court. The trial 
court judge correctly recognized this in his Conclusion of Law 7 
(Record, p. 682) which reads: 
7. The doctrine of res judicata does not 
apply to this case because the bankruptcy 
proceedings did not release defendants McBride 
and Alpine from their obligation to convey 
land or refund all or part of the June 25, 
1979, payment made by plaintiff. Furthermore, 
Child's bankruptcy plan failed. There was not 
an adjudication by the bankruptcy court of the 
claims involved in this lawsuit which would 
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preclude plaintiff from proceeding against 
defendants. 
IV 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS WERE TIMELY FILED 
WITHIN THE APPROPRIATE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
The trial court did not need to address the issue of the 
exact date the statute of limitations began running because either 
a four year or six year statute of limitations was complied with. 
Defendants' claim that the statute of limitations began to run on 
June 25, 1979, the day that McKean paid $330,000 in exchange for 
property. Plaintiff disputes the starting date because other 
conditions occurred after the $330,000 payment was made including 
McKean's selection of the specific land and Alpinefs resulting 
failure to deliver the land. In an action for possession of land, 
the cause of action does not arise until right of possession has 
been so challenged as to give rise to cause of action. Ash v. 
State, 572 P.2d 1374. See also State ex rel. v. Intermountain 
Farmers Association, 668 P.2d 503 (Utah 1983) However, if we take 
the earliest possible day of breach (June 25, 1985), plaintiff's 
action was still brought within 6 years. The six year statute of 
limitations as set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-23 provides 
that it applies for an action upon any contract, obligation, or 
liability founded upon writing (except those subject to the 8 year 
statute under 78-12-22). 
There are two written contracts upon which this action is 
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based. The contract between Alpine Ltd. and New Empire Group 
provides for the release of the property upon payment of sums and 
certain elections being made. McKean made the payment on behalf of 
himself and New Empire Group on June 25, 1979. McKean also had his 
own written contract with New Empire Group allowing him to acquire 
the New Empire's interest in the Alpine contract. Subsequently 
McKean received a complete assignment of the New Empire Group's 
cause of action. In either scenario this action arises from a 
written contract and the suit was filed timely. 
Defendants claim that the statute of limitations should 
be four years rather than six years. It was not until 1985 when 
the remedy of specific performance under the written contract was 
barred by action of the bankruptcy court so that plaintiff could 
proceed to seek an alternative remedy other than requiring delivery 
of the land. Plaintiff brought his action seeking dollar damages 
or such further relief as the court deems just and equitable on 
June 21, 1985. (Finding of Fact 23, Record p. 677) 
The trial court found that the six year statute of 
limitations applied. However, the court further found that it made 
no difference whether a shorter statute of limitations applied 
because the bankruptcy proceedings tolled or stayed McKean's 
ability to sue under the contract between February 25, 1982, and 
the time of conveyance by the trustee of his interest in the 
property on March 21, 1985. (Conclusion of Law 8, Record, p. 683) 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-41 specifically provides: 
33 
When the commencement of an action is 
stayed by injunction or a statutory 
prohibition the time of the continuance of the 
injunction or prohibition is not part of the 
time limited for the commencement of the 
action. 
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the application of said tolling 
provision in Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. v. Hardy, 834 P.2d 554 (Utah 
1992) . Considering the period the statute was tolled, the action 
was actually filed in less than three years from the earliest 
possible date the statute of limitations could have commenced. 
Having so decreed, the trial court did not have to address the 
issue of the exact date of breach that would have started the 
statute running. 
Defendants argue that plaintiff's only cause of action 
rested upon a right to recover the land. However, when loss of the 
land or other circumstances make specific performance impossible, 
the law allows the court to fashion an appropriate equitable 
remedy. Until the security was lost through the bankruptcy court's 
actions, the appropriate remedy would have been to recover the 
land. (See contract, Record, p. 14) During the bankruptcy period, 
McKean could not proceed against the land because the automatic 
stay provisions of the bankruptcy code, 11 U.S.C. § 362 prevented 
any action that would seek to obtain possession or exercise control 
over the subject land. Said statute provides that: 
[A] petition filed ... operates as a stay, 
applicable to all entities, of ... 
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(3) any act to obtain possession of 
property of the estate or of property from the 
estate or to exercise control over property of 
the estate; 
The statute also prevents any act to enforce any lien. 
Defendants rely on the case of Brown v. Cleverly, 92 Utah 
54 (1937) which is clearly distinguishable. It did not arise out 
of a written contract. The Brown case was an equitable action to 
impress a vendor lien based on an implied contract. The Brown case 
has also been distinguished in subsequent cases. See Hardinae Co. 
v. Eimco Corp.. 266 P.2d 494 (Utah 1954) and Juab County Department 
of Public Welfare v. Summers, 426 P.2d 1 (Utah 1967). These cases 
hold that when doubt exists as to whether a transaction is under a 
written contract or another basis, the longer rather than the 
shorter period of limitation is to be preferred. 
Appellee proceeded within a few weeks of the time the 
property was sold by the bankruptcy court to commence this action 
against Alpine Ltd. Subsequently the Complaint was amended to 
specifically name the general partners of Alpine by name as being 
the responsible general partners. Appellants argue that the 
amendment specifically identifying the individuals who were general 
partners was not timely. However, the general partners were in 
fact already parties in the suit because the general partnership 
Alpine Ltd. was a defendant. There was an identity of interest by 
these parties. Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
discusses the amending of pleadings so the amendment relates to the 
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date of the original pleading. In Doxey-Layton Company v. Clark, 
548 P.2d 902, 906, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
There is an exception to this rule. The 
exception operates where there is a relation 
back, as to both plaintiff and defendant, when 
new and old parties have an identity of 
interest; so it can be assumed or proved the 
relation back is not prejudicial. The 
rationale underpinning this exception is one 
which obstructs a mechanical use of a statute 
of limitations; to prevent adjudication of a 
claim. Such is particularly valid where, as 
here, the real parties in interest were 
sufficiently alerted to the proceedings, or 
were involved in them unofficially, from an 
early stage. 
In the case at bar, by naming the general partnership the 
general partners were unofficially involved from the commencement 
of the action. The statute of limitations has been fully complied 
with by the plaintiff, whether it is a six year or a four year 
statute, and whether the individual partners were named in the 
original or the amended complaint. The conclusion of law of the 
trial judge finding the action was timely brought within the 
appropriate statute of limintations should be affirmed. 
V 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT DEFENDANTS 
DID NOT HAVE SUMS OWING THEM WHICH THEY WOULD BE 
ENTITLED TO OFFSET 
Appellants1 argument that it was a right of setoff 
ignores the fact that the court found there was not a setoff. 
Defendant Alpine failed to deliver land for payment received. 
There was a breach of contract by Alpine Ltd. when Alpine received 
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$330,000 and refused to deliver land. At the time of breach there 
was no money owing to Alpine by McKean or by New Empire Group. The 
fact that New Empire Group did not make payments in subsequent 
years is totally immaterial. It was not expected that once the 
contract was breached by Alpine that New Empire would be expected 
to pay additional funds when Alpine had not, could not or would not 
perform its duties under the contract. Once the breach was 
established, further payments did not accrue. In Finding of Fact 
28, the court specifically found that "[a]s of June 25, 1979, the 
New Empire Group was current in all of its payments and was not in 
default in the material conditions of the June 1, 1978, contract 
with defendants Alpine and Michael McBride." The court held in 
Conclusions of Law 2 and 3 as follows: 
2. Upon payment of the $330,000 on June 
25, 1979, and the designation of property to 
be released, plaintiff satisfied the New 
Empire Group's obligations under the Contract 
with the defendants. As of June 25, 1979, 
defendant Alpine had an unconditional duty to 
either convey land or refund the $330,000 
payment Alpine received that day. Defendant 
Alpine Ltd. breached its contract by failing 
to convey land of $220,000 value as contracted 
or to refund the $330,000 payment paid on June 
25, 1979. 
3. After defendants McBride and Alpine 
Ltd. breached their contract with New Empire 
by failing to release land, New Empire and 
Richard McKean were not obligated to perform 
other duties under the contract or make other 
payments until Alpine Ltd. had performed its 
duties to release designated land as per the 
terms of the contract. 
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There being no right of setoff against the breach of 
contract, the cases cited by appellants have no application in this 
case. Any right of setoff arising from other relationships between 
the parties, if they existed, was not pled or made a part of these 
proceedings and certainly does not pertain to plaintiff McKean. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants1 issues on appeal have been made moot by the 
defendants1 actions in acquiring plaintiff's interest in this 
matter and satisfying the judgment. The appeal should be dismissed 
and the matter remanded to the District Court for determination of 
the amount of the plaintiff's attorney's lien which is secured by 
the property bond pledged by defendants. In the event the matter 
is not determined to be moot, the appeal should be denied on the 
merits for the reasons stated herein with costs awarded to the 
plaintiff. The court's findings of fact are not at issue and 
should be accepted. Based on the undisputed facts, the conclusions 
of law and judgment of the trial judge should be affirmed. 
DATED this day of September 1993. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RALPH R. TATE, JR. 
Attorney for Appellee 
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ADDENDUM 
Pertinent Documents 
The determinative bankruptcy statutes, Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, Judgment, and pertinent contracts are attached 
to defendants/appellants1 brief and therefore are not duplicated. 
The following additional documents and statutes are 
attached hereto: 
11 U.S.C. § 349 
Utah Code Annotated 78-12-41 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order on 
Pending Motions, dated May 5, 1993 (after special 
hearing on temporary remand from this court) 
BANKRUPTCY CODE 154 
ier Bankruptcy Manual Ch. 348 (3d ed. 1986). 
ler Bankruptcy Practice Guide Ch. 37 (1986). 
SECTION 349 (11 U.S.C. §349) 
19. Effect of dismissal. 
Unless the court, for cause, orders otherwise, the 
ssal of a case under this title does not bar the discharge, 
iter case under this title, of debts that were dischargable 
case dismissed; nor does the dismissal of a case under 
itle prejudice the debtor with regard to the filing of a 
juent petition under this title, except as provided in 
n 109(f) of this title. 
Unless the court, for cause, orders otherwise, a dismissal 
3ase other than under section 742 of this title— 
(1) reinstates— 
(A) any proceeding or custodianship superseded 
under section 543 of this title; 
( B ) any transfer avoided under section 522, 544, 545, 
547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of this title, or preserved under 
section 510(c)(2), 522(i)(2), or 551 of this title; and 
(C) any lien voided under section 506(d) of this title; 
(2) vacates any order, judgment, or transfer ordered, 
nder section 522( i ) ( l ) , 542, 550, or 553 of this title; and 
(3) revests the property of the estate in the entity in 
hich such property was vested immediately before the 
>mmencement of the case under this title. 
Legislative History 
section (a) specifies that unless the court for cause orders 
ise, the dismissal of a case is without prejudice. The debtor is 
rred from receiving a discharge in a later case of debts that 
ischargeable in the case dismissed. Of course, this subsection 
only to pre-discharge dismissals. If the debtor has already 
id a discharge and it is not revoked, then the debtor would be 
under section 727(a) from receiving a discharge in a 
uent liquidation case for six years. Dismissal of an involun-
I the merits will generally not give rise to adequate cause so as 
the debtor from further relief. 
155 CASE ADMINISTRATION § 349 
or custodianships that were superseded by the bankruptcy case, 
reinstates avoided transfers, reinstates voided liens, vacates any 
order, judgment, or transfer ordered as a result of the avoidance of a 
transfer, and revests the property of the estate in the entity in which 
the property was vested at the commencement of the case. The court 
is permitted to order a different result for cause.[The basic purpose 
of the subsection is to undo the bankruptcy case, as far as 
practicable, and to restore all property rights to the position in which 
they were found at the commencement of the case. This does not 
necessarily encompass undoing sales of property from the estate to a 
good faith purchaser. Where there is a question over the scope of the 
subsection, the court will make the appropriate orders to protect 
rights acquired in reliance on the bankruptcy case. 
[House Report No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 337-38 (1977); Senate 
Report No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 48-9 (1978). ] 
Section 349(b)(2) of the House amendment adds a cross reference 
to section 553 to reflect the new right of recovery of setoffs created 
under that section. Corresponding changes are made throughout the 
House amendment. 
[124 Cong. Rec. S 17,408 (Oct. 6, 1978).] 
Comment 
Section 742, referred to in subsection (b) of section 349 deals with 
SIPA cases and provides for dismissal of the case if SIPC completes 
liquidation of the debtor. 
Section 506(d) referred to in subsection (b)(1)(C) provides that to 
the extent a secured claim is not allowed, its lien is void except under 
certain specified circumstances. 
Former Bankruptcy Rule 120(c), entitled "Effect of Dismissal" 
merely provided that unless the order specified to the contrary, a 
dismissal of a case otherwise than on the merits was without 
prejudice. There was no comparable provision in the Act. Prior to the 
rule, dismissal often operated harshly against the debtor. See, e.g.. In 
re Frey, 95 F . Supp. 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). 
Section 17b of the Act provided that failure of a bankrupt or 
debtor to obtain a discharge in a prior bankruptcy case for certain 
specified reasons should not bar the release by discharge in a 
subsequent case under the Act of debts that were dischargeable in the 
prior case. One of the specified reasons was dismissal of the prior 
case without prejudice for failure to pay filing fees or to secure 
costs. 
Section 67a, relating to avoidance of judicial liens had a proviso to 
the effect that if the bankrupt or debtor was not finally adjudged a 
bankrupt and if no arrangement or plan was proposed or confirmed, 
the nullified lien would be deemed reinstated with the same effect as 
if it had not been nullified and voided. 
Bankruptcy Rule 1017 deals with dismissal or suspension of a case. 
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 78-12-43 
brought within specified time after failure of Key Numbers. — Limitations of Actions <&= 
prior action for cause other than on the merits, 130. 
16 A.L.R.3d 452. 
78-12-41. Effect of injunction or prohibition. 
When the commencement of an action is stayed by injunction or a statutory 
prohibition the time of the continuance of the injunction or prohibition is not 
part of the time limited for the commencement of the action. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Cross-References. — Injunctions, Rule 
Supp., 104-12-41. 65A, U.R.C.P. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation Key Numbers. — Limitation of Actions «= 
of Actions §§ 170, 171. 111. 
C.J.S. — 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions 
§§ 124, 125. 
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RALPH R. TATE (#3192) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
4685 Highland Drive, Suite 202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: 278-4747 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
RICHARD F. McKEAN, 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHEAL W. McBRIDE, ALPINE LTD., 
FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, GEODYNE II, a 
Utah general partnership, DAN C. 
SIMONS, and ARDEN J. BODELL, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS 
Civil No. C85-4003 
(Judge Rokich) 
The above matter came before this court before the Honorable John A. 
Rokich on March 9, 1993, at 10:00 a.m. for the following matters: 
1. On the temporary remand from the Utah Court of Appeals for the 
trial court to rule on issues raised in plaintiffs Motion for Court Order Vacating Full 
Satisfaction of Judgment, Ordering Satisfaction Not To Issue Until Attorney's Lien is 
Paid, Dismissing Defendants' Appeal, Enjoining Transfer of Assets Pledged in Lieu of 
Supersedeas Bond Until Attorney's Lien is Paid, and for Other Extraordinary Relief. 
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2. On plaintiffs Motion for Equitable Relief Determining Satisfaction 
of Judgment Is Only a Partial Satisfaction of Judgment and Ordering that Assets 
Pledged ify Lieu of Supersedeas Bond not be Released Until Attorney's Lien Has Been 
Paid. 
3. On defendants' Motion to Release Undertaking and Pledge. 
Plaintiff was represented by Ralph R. Tate, Jr. Defendants were 
represented by R. Stephen Marshall of Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy. The 
court having considered the respective memoranda and affidavits filed in connection 
with the motions and legal argument of counsel at the hearing, good cause appearing, 
hereby enters the following Findings of Fact which were undisputed by the parties. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The following facts were undisputed by the parties as shown by the 
memoranda on file and stipulation of counsel in open court: 
1. Subsequent to a bench trial on September 18, 1991, the Hon. 
John Rokich entered a judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendants for the 
sum of $485,689.76 together with accruing interest after July 22, 1991, and court 
costs incurred. 
2. Pursuant to a written agreement ("the fee agreement") between 
plaintiff and attorney Ralph R. Tate Jr. ("Tate"), Tate claims an attorney's Ken on the 
cause of action and the proceeds therefrom. A copy of the Notice of Attorney's Lien 
was initially filed with the Third Judicial District Court on September 11, 1990, and 
was amended April 17, 1992. Pursuant to the fee agreement plaintiff agreed to pay as 
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attorney's fees "30% of any sums recovered after legal action is filed but before any 
appeal is filed or before commencement of a second trial; 35% of any sums recovered 
if a second trial or appeal is necessary.... [A]ttorney Ralph R. Tate, Jr. shall have a 
hen on my cause of action or any proceeds received to secure payment of the 
attorney's fees agreed to herein.11 A copy of the fee agreement is attached to the 
Affidavit of Merlyn Hanks dated February 11, 1993, and filed with this court. 
3. Defendants filed an appeal which is presently pending before the 
Utah State Court of Appeals as Case No. 920705-CA which has not been dismissed. A 
motion to have the appeal dismissed and related motions were filed on January 15, 
1993, and are pending before the Utah Court of Appeals. 
4. A court order was signed by Judge John Rokich on March 20, 
1992, pursuant to stipulation between plaintiff McKean and defendants which 
provided a stay of execution in lieu of a supersedeas bond, provided that certain assets 
would be pledged as security to provide payment of the judgment upon appeal 
affirmation. Pursuant to said Stipulation, documents were executed and filed that 
gave public notice and perfected the security interests with the Clerk of the Court as 
the secured party. Said order restrained the transfer of certain assets by the 
defendants. 
5. WestOne Bank, as the successor to FMA Thrift and Loan Company 
and Moore Financial Company obtained a judgment against Richard McKean in an 
action filed in the First District Court, Box Elder County, State of Utah, entitled FMA 
Thrift and Loan Company, now known as Moore Financial Company of Utah, vs. 
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Alpha Leasing Company, a Utah general partnership consisting of Dorius E. Black, 
Joseph Cannon. McKean Equipment Company. Inc., McKean Construction Company, 
Inc.. Gritton and Associates, Richard J. McKean. Robert P. Ap^ood. and Rex J. Black, 
et al., Civil No. 17754. 
6. On September 28, 1991, WestOne Bank assigned its interest in 
the judgment obtained in the WestOne Bank action to Delaware Funding & Guaranty. 
Delaware thereafter executed on the judgment against McKean in the WestOne Bank 
action by causing the judgment in the present case to be sold at an execution sale 
conducted by the Salt Lake County Sheriff. Delaware, acting in the name of WestOne 
Bank, purchased the judgment at the sale by bidding $10,000.00 of the WestOne 
judgment. 
7. At the sheriffs sale and prior to bidding, plaintiff McKean's 
attorney Ralph Tate announced to all present that the judgment was subject to an 
attorney's lien of approximately $185,000 together with accruing interest. Because of 
said execution sale, Delaware now claims to be the successor to plaintiff McKean's 
interest in this matter. 
8. Richard A. Christensen is the president of Delaware Funding and 
Guaranty. Richard A. Christenson is also the President of Franklin Financial, a Utah 
corporation. Franklin Financial and defendant Geodyne II are general partners of TR 
Investments, Ltd., a Utah Limited Partnership. Defendant Alpine, Ltd., is a limited 
partner of TR Investments. The collateral pledged as security in this matter includes 
50% of Alpine Ltd.'s interest in TR Investments, Ltd. 
9. On January 8, 1993, Richard A. Christenson, representing himself 
to be acting as president of Delaware Funding & Guaranty (referred to herein as 
"Delaware") which claimed to be a successor to the plaintiffs interest, executed and 
filed a Satisfaction of Judgment with the court. 
10. The Satisfaction of Judgment filed by Christenson indicates that 
Delaware and Richard Christenson entered into an agreement to settle the matter with 
"defendants pursuant to an Agreement and Assignment between the parties." 
11. On January 8, 1993, defendants Alpine Ltd. Dan Simons and 
Arden J. Bodell and Geodyne II entered into that certain Agreement and Assignment 
with Delaware Funding and Guaranty, a Delaware corporation. A copy of the 
Agreement and Assignment is attached to the Affidavit of Merlyn Hanks dated 
February 11, 1993, and filed with this court. 
12. As attorney of record for plaintiff, Tate had no knowledge of any 
agreement or assignment between the parties until January 13, 1993, and has not 
consented to the satisfaction of the judgment and has not been paid any sums 
pursuant to his attorney's lien on file herein. 
13. The parties through their respective attorneys stipulated in open 
court that the assets which have been pledged in lieu of a supersedeas bond would not 
be released without further order of the court after an equitable action to be filed by 
plaintiffs counsel as to the validity and amount of plaintiffs counsel's attorneys lien is 
determined. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
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From the foregoing stipulated Findings of Fact, the court enters the 
following Conclusions of Law. 
1. While the court has the discretion to allow an equitable action to 
be brought in this proceeding for determination of attorney's lien and the effect of the 
satisfaction of judgment, the preferred procedure would be to have a separate 
equitable action filed where all issues may be raised and all entities who may have a 
responsibility for the payment of the attorney's fees or the filing of the satisfaction of 
judgment may be named as parties to the proceeding. 
2. The court concludes that in consideration of the stipulation of the 
parties and the equities in this case, the security that has been pledged in lieu of a 
supersedeas bond should remain on deposit with the clerk of the court and not be 
released until further order of the court after an equitable action to be filed by 
plaintiffs counsel as to the validity and amount of plaintiffs counsel's attorneys lien is 
determined. 
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion for Motion for Equitable Relief Determining 
Satisfaction of Judgment Is Only a Partial Satisfaction of Judgment is denied without 
prejudice with leave to bring a separate equitable action. 
2. Defendants' Motion to Release Undertaking and Pledge and 
plaintiffs Motion for Order that Assets Pledged in Lieu of Supersedeas Bond not be 
Released Until Attorney's Lien Has Been Paid shall be reserved for further 
consideration after final court determination or resolution of the independent action in 
088X33181.1 6 
equity to be filed by plaintiff seeking to determine the effect of counsel's attorney's 
lien and the amount of said lien. 
3. Pursuant to the order of the Court of Appeals dated February 16, 
1993, the clerk of the court shall prepare a supplemental record consisting of the 
proceedings on temporary remand for certification and transmittal to the Court of 
Appeals. 
DATED this c ^ d a y of May, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to form: 
R. SteJ>hin Marshall 
088X33181 1 7 
